Tobacco is a heavily pesticide-dependent crop. Because pesticides involve human safety and health issues, they are regulated nationally and internationally; however, little is known about how tobacco companies respond to regulatory pressures regarding pesticides. In this study we analyzed internal tobacco industry documents to describe industry activities aimed at influencing pesticide regulations. We used a case study approach based on examination of approximately 2,000 internal company documents and 3,885 pages of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests. The cases involved methoprene, the ethylene bisdithiocarbamates, and phosphine. We show how the tobacco industry successfully altered the outcome in two cases by hiring ex-agency scientists to write reports favorable to industry positions regarding pesticide regulations for national (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) and international (World Health Organization) regulatory bodies. We also show how the industry worked to forestall tobacco pesticide regulation by attempting to self-regulate in Europe, and how Philip Morris encouraged a pesticide manufacturer to apply for higher tolerance levels in Malaysia and Europe while keeping tobacco industry interest a secret from government regulators. This study suggests that the tobacco industry is able to exert considerable influence over the pesticide regulatory process and that increased scrutiny of this process and protection of the public interest in pesticide regulation may be warranted.
STUDY OBJECTIVE: To review the tobacco industry's Asian environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) consultants programme, focusing on three key nations: China, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.
METHODS: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private internal industry documents.
MAIN RESULTS: The release of the 1986 US Surgeon General's report on second hand smoke provoked tobacco companies to prepare for a major threat to their industry. Asian programme activities included conducting national/international symposiums, consultant "road shows" and extensive lobbying and media activities. The industry exploited confounding factors said to be unique to Asian societies such as diet, culture and urban pollution to downplay the health risks of ETS. The industry consultants were said to be "..prepared to do the kinds of things they were recruited to do".
CONCLUSIONS: The programme was successful in blurring the science on ETS and keeping the controversy alive both nationally and internationally. For the duration of the project, it also successfully dissuaded national policy makers from instituting comprehensive bans on smoking in public places.
OBJECTIVE: To review tobacco company strategies of using youth smoking prevention programmes to counteract the Malaysian government's tobacco control legislation and efforts in conducting research on youth to market to them.
METHODS: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private internal industry documents. Search terms included Malay, cmtm, jaycees, YAS, and direct marketing; 195 relevant documents were identified for this paper.
RESULTS: Industry internal documents reveal that youth anti-smoking programmes were launched to offset the government's tobacco control legislation. The programme was seen as a strategy to lobby key politicians and bureaucrats for support in preventing the passage of legislation. However, the industry continued to conduct research on youth, targeted them in marketing, and considered the teenage market vital for its survival. Promotional activities targeting youth were also carried out such as sports, notably football and motor racing, and entertainment events and cash prizes. Small, affordable packs of cigarettes were crucial to reach new smokers.
CONCLUSION: The tobacco industry in Malaysia engaged in duplicitous conduct in regard to youth. By buying into the youth smoking issue it sought to move higher on the moral playing field and strengthen its relationship with government, while at the same time continuing to market to youth. There is no evidence that industry youth smoking prevention programmes were effective in reducing smoking; however, they were effective in diluting the government's tobacco control legislation.
To review how tobacco transnational companies conducted their business in the hostile environment of Singapore, attempting to counter some of the government's tobacco control measures; to compare the Malaysian and the Singaporean governments' stance on tobacco control and the direct bearing of this on the way the tobacco companies conduct their business.
OBJECTIVE: To describe tobacco industry efforts in Malaysia to thwart government efforts to regulate tobacco promotion and health warnings.
METHODS: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private tobacco industry internal documents made available through the Master Settlement Agreement and secondary websites; relevant information from news articles and financial reports.
RESULTS: Commencing in the 1970s, the industry began to systematically thwart government tobacco control. Guidelines were successfully promoted in the place of legislation for over two decades. Even when the government succeeded in implementing regulations such as health warnings and advertising bans they were compromised and acted effectively to retard further progress for years to come.
CONCLUSION: Counter-measures to delay or thwart government efforts to regulate tobacco were initiated by the industry. Though not unique to Malaysia, the main difference lies in the degree to which strategies were used to successfully counter stringent tobacco control measures between 1970 and 1995.