"Medical tourism" has frequently been held to unsettle naturalised relationships between the state and its citizenry. Yet in casting "medical tourism" as either an outside "innovation" or "invasion," scholars have often ignored the role that the neoliberal retrenchment of social welfare structures has played in shaping the domestic health-care systems of the "developing" countries recognised as international medical travel destinations. While there is little doubt that "medical tourism" impacts destinations' health-care systems, it remains essential to contextualise them. This paper offers a reading of the emergence of "medical tourism" from within the context of ongoing health-care privatisation reform in one of today's most prominent destinations: Malaysia. It argues that "medical tourism" to Malaysia has been mobilised politically both to advance domestic health-care reform and to cast off the country's "underdeveloped" image not only among foreign patient-consumers but also among its own nationals, who are themselves increasingly envisioned by the Malaysian state as prospective health-care consumers.
This article examines the rationale behind the Heath government's 1970 decision to negotiate a Five Power Defence agreement with Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia and to maintain a small British military contingent in Southeast Asia as a part of this new politico-military framework. It argues that while its overriding foreign policy concern was to end Britain's problematic relationship with the European Economic Community and to make membership of this grouping the cornerstone of its foreign policy, the Heath government was careful not to cast Britain's post-imperial future in purely European terms. The successful negotiation of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in 1970-71 was instrumental in achieving this by ensuring that London would maintain close links with key Commonwealth partners in the Asian region. In what was not only an attempt to neutralize potential domestic opposition to Britain's entry into the EEC, but also a lingering reluctance to do away with the rhetoric of Britain as a leading power with extra-European interests, Heath was eager to show that by making a contribution to the stability of Southeast Asia, Britain still had a role to play outside Europe.